Intuitions: Reflective Justification, Holism and Apriority by Nenad Miščević
307
Croatian Journal of Philosophy
Vol. XV, No. 45, 2015
Intuitions: Refl ective Justifi cation, 
Holism and Apriority
NENAD MIŠČEVIĆ
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts,
University of Maribor, Slovenia
The paper discusses Sosa’s view of intuitional knowledge and raises the 
question of the nature of refl ective justifi cation of intuitional beliefs. It is 
assumed, in agreement with Sosa, that pieces of belief of good research-
ers are typically refl ectively justifi ed, in addition to being immediately, 
fi rst-level justifi ed. Sosa has convincingly argued that refl ective justifi -
cation typically mobilizes and indeed should mobilize capacities distinct 
from the original capacity that has produced the belief-candidate for 
being justifi ed, in order to assess the reliability of the original capacity. 
It has to go beyond justifi ers that are of the same-kind (“homogeneous”) 
as fi rst-level immediate ones, in order to enlarge the circle of justifi cation 
(and thus avoid viciousness), and is, therefore, holistic and coherent-
ist. But if this holds, it seems that refl ective justifi cation of armchair 
beliefs, presumably produced by intuition and some reasoning, should 
revert to empirical considerations testifying to the reliability of intuition 
and reasoning. Therefore, it typically combines, in an articulated way, 
a posteriori elements contributing to the thinker’s refl ective trust in her 
armchair capacities. In short, the paper argues that Sosa’s own view of 
second-order justifi cation goes better with a more aposteriorist view, if it 
does not even force such a view.
Keywords: Virtue epistemology, a priori, a posteriori, two-level 
epistemology, intuition.
1. Introduction
The paper discusses Sosa’s view of intuitional knowledge1 and raises the 
question of the nature of refl ective justifi cation of intuitional beliefs. I 
agree with him on many crucial matters, and have basically followed his 
1 My deepest thanks go to professor Sosa personally, for inspiration and support.
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footprints in opting for a version of virtue epistemology and indeed, a two 
level one, familiar from his writings.
Refl ection plays a paramount role in the biography of most serious 
intuitions, so what ought this role to be like? How does this strongly 
rationalistic approach fi t his second-level epistemology, and perspec-
tivalism (which I like and endorse myself), virtue-geared or otherwise? 
I shall argue that it does not fi t well, and that the holistic character 
of the second-level perspective points in a very different direction. A 
thinker refl ecting on her fi rst-level armchair beliefs is expected to mobi-
lize, should the need arise, literally all sorts of fi rst-level beliefs of hers, 
in the hope that these belong to her fi rst-level, animal knowledge. This 
might routinely include pieces of a posteriori knowledge. Can the arm-
chair belief, thus justifi ed, retain its aprioristic purity? Note that Sosa 
himself sometimes admits “[t]hat the refl ective defense of our math-
ematical and other beliefs will not be purely a priori (…)” (2000: 13), 
although he then almost takes the admission back, and never develops 
it to any extent.
Here, then, is is the plan of the paper. Section two offers a brief 
overview (with apologies for brevity) of Sosa’s subtle, interesting and 
original views, in particular about refl ective justifi cation in general, 
and about intuitions and intuitional beliefs. Section three is the central 
one: there it is argued that the proposed accounts of the two topics just 
mentioned do not fi t well with each other: the general story of refl ective 
justifi cation stresses the role of broad coherence and a holistic web of 
belief, the particular story of justifi cation of intuitions insists on ho-
mogenous justifi cation of the a priori by the a priori. In the concluding 
section I shall briefl y sketch my own proposal that the full justifi cation 
of the deliverances of intuition is a highly structured one, as one would 
expect from the holistic character of second-level, refl ective consider-
ations, with some a priori elements, but with a suffi ciently large a pos-
teriori component to ultimately make it predominantly a posteriori. I 
conclude by reiterating three main questions for professor Sosa, thank-
ing him in advance for an answer I know will be illuminating.
2. Sosa’s proposal
a) refl ective knowledge, broad coherence and the web of belief
Let me fi rst remind you of Sosa’s highly original proposal of a systemat-
ic virtue epistemology, and in particular of his views on two connected 
subtopics that we shall discuss in the rest of the paper: fi rst, refl ective 
knowledge, and second, intuitions and their justifi cation.
The basic idea, with which I very much agree, is the general frame-
work, stressing epistemic competences-virtues, and their truth-direct-
edness. A crucial element characterizing Sosa’s approach is the idea of 
the general epistemic structure, contrasting and combining the basic 
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level of fi rst-order (“animal”) competences-cum-performances with a 
refl ective, second-order level (2007, 2009b).2
What characterizes refl ective knowledge is “perspectival endorse-
ment of the reliability of one’s sources”. (2009b: 136). It nicely brings 
together coherence and understanding, Sosa argues (2009b: 138). He il-
lustrates it by bringing in Descartes’s strategy of supporting fi rst-level 
intuitional beliefs, prominently mathematical ones, by theological rea-
soning guaranteeing the coherence of the whole, and thus turning the 
mere cognitio of mathematical truths into scientia. The feature of re-
fl ective knowledge which will interest us most is what he calls “broad” 
or “comprehensive” coherence.
This stands in contrast with other theories of refl ective knowledge, 
of a different kind, which argue that a fi rst-level competence can be 
second-level justifi ed, just by being re-applied, or again appealed to, in 
a refl ective manner. Sosa (1994), criticizes W. Alston, the main propo-
nent of this same-sort or homogenous second-order justifi cation. It is 
combination of competences that does the work. Here is a characteris-
tic passage:
How does internal coherence, of little signifi cant epistemic value in itself, 
become more valuable when combined with external competence? Coher-
ence-seeking inferential reason, like retentive memory, is valuable when 
combined with externally competent faculties of perception, because when 
so combined it, like retentive memory, gives us a more comprehensive grasp 
of the truth than we would have in its absence. (2009b: 191)
The broad coherence goes beyond relations among the thinker’s fi rst-
order beliefs, and involves coherence between them and the thinker’s 
experiences, as well as comprehensive inter-level coherence (2009b: 
192). It is necessary, Sosa claims, for the kind of refl ective knowledge 
traditionally desired and desirable for its contribution to truth. One 
important component of the broad, comprehensive coherence is  ex-
planatory coherence, the contribution of some beliefs to a deeper un-
derstanding of others, and perhaps vice versa. Interpreting Descartes 
in an interesting and original way, Sosa stresses the “epistemic power” 
of such explanatory coherence. Even our mathematical knowledge can 
be helped by “a view of ourselves and our place in the universe” that is 
suffi ciently comprehensive and coherent to bring us “into the realm of 
higher, refl ective, enlightened knowledge, or “scientia” (2009b: 150).
Let me fi nally mention the metaphor which will be crucial in the 
discussion section: the pipeline/web contrast (2009b: 239, reiterated 
in 2011b: 150). The role of refl ective epistemic justifi cation is not well 
2 In his (2011b), and then further in (2015), he introduces an additional component 
of, or condition upon,  refl ective knowledge, characterizing an epistemic performance as 
fully apt “only if its fi rst-order aptness derives suffi ciently from the agent’s assessment, 
albeit implicit, of his chances of success (and, correlatively, of the risk of failure)” (2011b: 
11); we shall leave this refi nement aside in the present paper.
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characterized by the metaphor of the pipeline. The right picture is the 
coherentist one of the web of belief. Sosa talks about “an intricate spi-
der’s web” with its many nodes. He mentions that the position of each 
node (the status of each belief, we are allowed to suppose) might de-
pend causally (to some extent, perhaps to a small extent) on the posi-
tions of the other nodes. This would yield a “distributive dependence on 
each and also collective dependence on all” (2011b: 150). That option, 
he claims, “explains a web model for belief”, adding that perhaps even 
more data should be added, having to do with the dynamical, historical 
dimension. Here, I am in broad agreement with Sosa and will appeal to 
these ideas when it comes to the issue of a priori justifi cation.
We now pass to our specifi c topic, intuition. Sosa agrees with the tra-
dition, in particular the rationalist one, that there are intuitions, which 
form a distinct group of phenomena, and that there is an intuition-dispo-
sition/competence. Intuitions are a special sort of intellectual seemings, 
attractions to assent to a proposition triggered simply by considering 
a proposition consciously with understanding. Sosa is, to my mind 
correctly, optimistic when it comes to the reliability of intuitions: “By 
analogy to the seemings delivered by our visual system, the intuitions 
immediately delivered by our rational competences are preponderant-
ly true, even if occasionally false. This is why those rational mecha-
nisms are intellectual competences, because they systematically lead 
us aright.” (Sosa 2007: 60).
The epistemic quality of the intuitional (as well as perceptual or intro-
spectional) appearances depends on the quality of the underlying virtu-
ous dispositions, formed in normal circumstances. And this brings us to 
issues of justifi cation: “All seemings delivered by such competences are 
thereby epistemically justifi ed”, writes Sosa in the immediate sequel.
So, appearance is fallible, but still a fundamental source of justifi -
cation. It is such even in the case of paradoxes, robust, powerful and 
entrenched, and thus a source of justifi cation. But sometimes it can fail 
to be a source of knowledge, e.g. in the evil demon world, or in a world 
where one memorizes arithmetic tables by using a manual containing a 
large number of errors. For the sake of coherence we have to fi nd some 
correlation between appearance as a source of justifi cation and appear-
ance as a source of knowledge. When is appearance a trustworthy justi-
fi er? Intellectual appearance is a trustworthy justifi er when based on 
understanding, we are told. And here is the gist:
S rationally intuits that p if and only if S’s intuitive attraction to assent to 
<p> is explained by a competence (an epistemic ability or virtue) on the part 
of S to discriminate, among contents that he understands well enough, the 
true from the false, in some subfi eld of the modally strong (the necessarily 
true or necessarily false), with no reliance on introspection, perception, mem-
ory, testimony, or inference (no further reliance, anyhow, than any required 
for so much as understanding the given proposition). (Sosa 2007: 61)3
3 Here is a longer quote, Sosa’s answer to the question of “Just How Can 
Understanding Function as a Source of Epistemic Standing for Intuitions?”:
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So much about the fi rst level justifi cation of an intuition, with apologies 
for brevity.
At the second, meta-cognitive level, we encounter the thinker’s re-
fl ective awareness of the quality of her fi rst-level source, e.g. her re-
fl ective questioning of or trust in her intuitions. Thinkers, including 
ourselves, spontaneously fi nd their intuitions true in a very compelling 
manner, and therefore, on a refl exive level, consider their intuition-
capacity and their reason generally de facto reliable. This reliability 
of the fi rst-order source, if available, yields an external, third person 
justifi edness. In contrast, the refl exive or meta-cognitive, second-order 
trust in one’s own reliability, if justifi ed, would make us, the thinkers, 
refl ectively justifi ed on the second level. As refl ective creatures aiming 
at truth, we need both levels of justifi cation for our fi rst-order beliefs, 
including the intuitional ones. Such a two-level view of justifi cation 
has been probably implicit in classical epistemology (Descartes), and is 
nowadays proposed by various authors, not only Sosa, but also K. Leh-
rer, W. Alston and J. van Cleve, with a lot of difference of detail. With 
Sosa’s general view of refl ective justifi cation one would expect that the 
thinker may and ought to use on the second level of refl exive question-
ing all the available sources in order to assess the reliability (and other 
virtues) of a given fi rst-order source, in this case of intuition or reason. 
However, when we look at Sosa’s actual pronouncements, it seems as 
if  with intuition and introspection the refl ective justifi cation is just a 
matter of indubitability. As regards the latter, Sosa is clearly in favor of 
circular self-validation, an appeal to the deliverances of our introspec-
tive faculty under refl ective perspectival consideration (2000: 10). At 
the second level we are prompted to see necessary infallibility (reliabil-
ity) of our fi rst level introspective thoughts. And no causal knowledge is 
to be involved: “For the cogito the explanation of infallible reliability… 
skirts both causal tracking and construction or judgment dependence.” 
Fundamental, intuitive rational beliefs are based at least on understanding of 
the propositions believed, or so it has been argued above. It is not, however, just 
the understanding of a proposition, whatever its content, that gives a proper 
basis for believing it. Otherwise, it would also constitute a basis for believing 
its negation, which must be equally well understood. Not even the highest pitch 
of clarity and distinctness will suffi ce. (…) What suffi ces is rather the being 
understood (shared by a proposition and its negation pretty much equally) along 
with the specifi c content of that very proposition. Can we go beyond this to some 
general feature that, when combined with the being understood, will properly 
yield acceptance? As we have seen, neither simplicity nor truth is such a feature, 
either singly or in combination.
Nevertheless, something distinguishes simple truths of arithmetic or geometry, 
for example, making them suitable objects of immediate acceptance upon 
understanding, and giving them their attraction to normal human minds 
universally (upon understanding). Whatever it is, whether innate or socially 
instilled, its yield is uniform and general enough to suggest dispositions at work 
(whether wholly individually seated, or partially socially seated). Given how 
epistemically benign they are, fi nally, such dispositions seem not inappropriately 
considered “competences.” (Sosa 2014: 49)
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(2002: 376). Note that this is not an account of fi rst-level justifi cation 
but an account of “the required epistemic perspective” on the reliabil-
ity of our source of a priori justifi cation. “It is only when we see the 
cogito as not just infallible, but also indubitable (upon consideration) 
that we grasp the fuller Cartesian account” (Ibid.). The same holds for 
typical intuitional beliefs. Their reliability is comprehensible “through 
refl ection about the content-determining conditions of our thought.” 
(2003:183). Take logic: “Results in proof theory, or in metatheory more 
generally, might thus explain why it is that our thoughts in the rel-
evant fi elds are likely to be right, or even bound to be right, if we follow 
certain methods” (2003: 183–4). And Sosa then raises the crucial, albeit 
rhetorical question: “What rules out the possibility of such general un-
derstanding of our own reliability on the a priori, precisely by means of 
properly directed a priori theorizing?” (Ibid.) We justify the a priori by 
the a priori.4 This will be the main topic of our discussion.
3. Discussion and open questions: 
epistemic perspective and its requirements
a) First level: the sources of competence
The fi rst question that I would like to raise is a relatively minor one. 
Sosa claims that the foundationalism/coherentism contrast is a false 
dichotomy, and accepts coherentism at the refl ective level. But what 
about the fi rst component, foundationalism? In the case of intuitions 
one often has strong seemings in favor of some given option, for in-
stance, in the case of the Ship of Theseus that the still sailing ship 
is identical with the original one. Sosa interprets these seemings as 
conceptually grounded inclinations to believe (e.g. in 2011a: 456; he ex-
plicitly mentions logic but the context seems to point to a general view 
encompassing philosophical intuitions as well). Now, he fi nds them 
justifi ed only if they derive from reliable competence; the fact that the 
thinker is responsibly responding to the seeming itself, independently 
from the externalist considerations of reliability, does not even prima 
facie justify her (if I got Sosa right). But then, it is strange that coher-
entism appears at the sophisticated level, one of refl ection, and the 
traditional foundationalism of clear and attractive appearances plays 
no role: the dichotomy seems to re-emerge, although it was deemed to 
be false. If Sosa accepted that at least some prima facie justifi cation is 
bestowed to the belief by the seeming-attraction he would end up with 
two tiers,  the coherentist and the foundationalist, in addition to the 
4 Here is another formulation from the same context:
“Whether that project can succeed or not, anyhow, the fact remains that 
its success would give us an a priori component for our desired epistemic 
perspective, a component that in the respect of being substantially a priori 
would match the Cartesian epistemic refl ections traditionally accorded the 
highest explanatory effi cacy in epistemology” (Sosa 2003: 85).
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two levels. The question for professor Sosa is then whether this would 
be acceptable for him, and if not, why.
The second question concerns competence. It is the central factor 
both in the production and in the justifi cation of intuition. But what 
explains competence? Sosa is hopeful that “epistemic competences can 
be of use in epistemology even in the absence of a detailed theory of 
their nature and operation.” (2013: 200). He claims that we can appeal 
to them “even with limited understanding of their modus operandi” 
(Ibid.) and directs the reader to his “Minimal intuition” (1998) paper. 
However, this early paper offers only a minimal(ist) answer: one can 
restrict one’s confi dence in intuitions worthy of being trusted, and this 
will yield some perspective on one’s capacities (1998: 267).
And this low level of demands for refl ective justifi cation holds for 
all competences, perception included. Having read Refl ective knowledge 
one would have expected more. And a specifi c worry about intuition also 
arises here. For perception, people had some idea of things acting upon 
our senses through some kind of medium. Even a moderately sophisti-
cated person, at any time in written history, would be aware that she 
sees things through the intermediary of light: no light, no seeing. The 
same for hearing, taste and touch. She would know that a rough surface 
acts upon her fi ngers when she is touching it, and that the touching 
becomes more risky if the surface is hot, turning the sensation of touch 
into intense pain. However, as we are painfully reminded in the discus-
sion of Benacerraf’s dilemma, there is no convincing commonsense story 
about the build-up of our numerical competence. What about philosoph-
ical intuitions? Metaphysical ones, moral ones and so on?
We can gauge the importance of the question by taking a glance at 
Sosa’s main resource for dealing with criticism of intuitions for their 
unreliability, alleged or real. When presenting his theory that the at-
traction or belief is justifi ed because it is competent (2007: 59), and 
facing the problem of fallacies in reasoning, Sosa introduces the Chom-
skian performance-competence distinction:
Fallacies can thus be viewed as performance errors chargeable against the 
subject, by contrast with deliverances of a competence. Unlike the Cartesian 
assimilation model, this account can admit the fallibility of intuition, can al-
low that paradox-enmeshed propositional contents exert proper attraction, 
on which one might even base justifi ed intuitive belief. (Sosa 2007: 59)
His account is subtle: some errors are due to performance defi cits, oth-
er to natural defects of the competence (early formulation already in 
Sosa 1998: 261). I agree with him that this is a perfect starting point 
for settling problems with X-phi, and I applaud most things he has to say 
in this context (in his (2010), and (2011a) papers).5
5 He brings in comparison with perceptual illusion, using the Mueller-Lyer one as 
his example. And he notes that the attraction is a deliverance of the normal human 
visual system, and is to be put on the account of the competence itself.
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Two question arise at this point for the epistemologists construct-
ing a theory. First, how do we distinguish between performance er-
rors and the defi cits of competence unless we know more about how 
the latter works? Second, if Sosa is really alluding to the Chomskian 
performance-competence distinction, his use of “competent” is a thick 
one; the attraction and belief are competent only if they are derived 
from the corresponding (virtuous) competence. The same presumably 
holds for beliefs that <3+2=5>, or that <A square has four sides>, listed 
earlier in the chapter (Sosa 2007: 46). It is here that the Chomskian 
problematic shows its bite: mental linguistic competence is reliable, 
even virtuous in Sosa’s term, because it dictates what the correspond-
ing language is and is like. The order of determination goes from com-
petence to its product. And the order of determination secures the lion’s 
share of justifi cation: I am competent in believing that my linguistic 
judgment is OK because I am judging my language(modulo all the res-
ervations having to do with thorny issues of the relation between idio-
lect and various sociolects; here we only rehearse the main point.)
This order of determination is not available for examples like Mo-
dus Ponens, <3+2=5>, and <A square has four sides>, unless one goes 
strongly anti-realist and response-dependentist about logic, arithmetic 
and geometry. Of course, Sosa does not take this line. Here, it is not 
the thinker’s competence that makes it true that a square has four 
sides, and the like, but rather the opposite holds: the mental structure-
module and its functioning is virtuous because it conforms to an in-
dependent mathematical fact. And indeed he reiterates the contrast 
between justifi cation by testimony and justifi cation by understanding. 
He distinguishes between determination of best opinion and tracking 
by best opinion. Determination by best opinion: 5 being prime because 
best opinion would think it prime. Tracking by best opinion: 5 being 
thought prime by best opinion because it is prime (Sosa 2002: 370).
But once the realist stance is taken, the issue of explanation becomes 
pressing. How is the tracking secured? Sosa appeals to the alleged origin 
of intuition from understanding, primarily a conceptual one. But we need 
more. To return to the Ship of Theseus example, what is it about con-
cepts that makes one think that the still sailing ship is identical with the 
original one? Something about the concept “ship”? Or “material object”? 
But what makes our concept track reality in these matters? Similarly 
with simple mathematical beliefs. If our concepts have the impressive 
power to put us in touch with mathematical reality, we should at least 
have some inkling of how this is possible. Sosa’s role-model epistemolo-
gist, Descartes, was ontologically committed to the existence of God, and 
used that commitment as the epistemic guarantee of the cogito proposi-
tions. Scientia (refl ective knowledge) is all about such a commitment. 
Remember that the refl ective perspective has to give us a substantive 
understanding of our fi rst-level beliefs, at least in cases in which we 
want to say that we know full well what we are talking about.
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Here, then, is the second question for professor Sosa: do you have a 
view about how our intuitional competence connects with the world it 
produces judgments (more precisely, attractions to judge) about? Intu-
itions seem to connect us to mathematical and modal reality, to facts 
of metaphysical signifi cance (the Ship of Theseus), moral signifi cance 
(the Trolley problem), and perhaps more (linguistic intuitions, etc.). Let 
us agree that concepts are somehow involved in the feat; but how pre-
cisely?
b) Second level: intuition, broad coherence and the web of belief
Let us now pass to our main topic, the refl ective justifi cation of intu-
itions and the role and character of epistemic perspective, and to some 
possible substantive disagreement. Since Sosa often discusses intro-
spection in the same breath with intuition, as a related a priori source, 
we shall follow him and occasionally mention introspection in the con-
text. What does refl ective perspective involve in the case of intuition 
and introspection?
We know that it cannot be just a reiteration of the fi rst-level thought 
(this much is clear from Sosa’s criticism of Alston); it seems then that 
coherent perspective is the only candidate. The reader who has formed 
her impression from reading Sosa’s main statements on the nature of 
refl ective knowledge in his (Sosa 2009a and 2011b) would probably ex-
pect the stress on broad coherence: after all, it is such coherence that 
takes us from mere cognitio to scientia. She would also remember the 
metaphor of the web, and its strongly coherentist morals: every node 
(belief) is to some extent justifi cationally connected to every other. She 
would keep in mind that the web of belief is connecting us causally to 
the facts in our environment (Sosa 2011b: 150).
Of course, such a reader is in for surprises. It looks as no appeal to 
coherence is involved, not even the very narrow one, let alone the broad 
one praised as crucial for the refl ective level in the general cases. How 
signifi cant and how ad hoc this exception is can be seen from compari-
son with Sosa’s general reading of Descartes, which stresses the impor-
tance of a circle, and of a more systematic, coherence-seeking refl ection 
at the second level.
We noted that with intuition and introspection it looks as if justifi -
cation is just a matter of indubitability and of circular self-validation, 
an appeal to the deliverances of our introspective faculty under refl ec-
tive perspectival consideration. (Sosa 2000: 10). We are prompted to 
see necessary infallibility (reliability) of our fi rst-level introspective 
thoughts. And no causal knowledge is to be involved: “For the cogito the 
explanation of infallible reliability … skirts both causal tracking and 
construction or judgment dependence.” (Sosa 2002: 376). Note that this 
is not an account of  fi rst-level justifi cation but an account of “the re-
quired epistemic perspective” on the reliability of our source of a priori 
justifi cation. “It is only when we see the cogito as not just infallible, but 
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also indubitable (upon consideration) that we grasp the fuller Cartesian 
account” (Ibid.). How does this differ from Alston’s same-sort refl ective 
justifi cation, in which a capacity is second-order justifi ed just by the 
re-application of itself, the very competence to be justifi ed? And Sosa 
has been quite critical of Alston’s strategy (1994). He has insisted on 
the holistic character of refl ective justifi cation, in contrast to Alston’s 
project of “homogenous” justifi cation of the similar by the similar.
Again, as mentioned in section 2, we are offered an analogous ac-
count of human knowledge of elementary mathematical truths and 
other necessary propositions. Intellectual appearance is a trustworthy 
justifi er when based on understanding. Sosa reiterates the claim in a 
more recent paper: “What distinguishes intuitive justifi cation is that 
the entertaining itself (with adequate understanding) of that specifi c 
content exerts its attraction while rationally unaided. Intuitions are 
reason-based in a way that does not go beyond conscious grasp of the 
specifi c propositional content” (Sosa 2014: 48). Sosa is happy to note 
that this circumvents the challenge of Benacerraf’s dilemma: we do not 
need to connect the Platonic facts with our knowledge of them by any 
sort of explanatory route, other than the claim that our concepts (or 
even mere symbols) can put us in touch with relevant mathematical 
properties (Sosa 2002: 380). Not much is left of the web metaphor, and 
the claim that it connects us with facts in our environment in an intel-
ligible way. Remember, it was claimed that “[j]ustifi ed beliefs are nodes 
of a web properly attached to the environing world through perception 
and memory” (2011b: 150).6
The web-pipe contrast is also gone: the understanding that produces 
intuition justifi es it on the refl ective level. Connections of every belief 
(node) with all other nodes seem to be totally irrelevant; even the con-
nection of any kind with any of the non-homogenous nodes disappears!
Let me then try to reconcile Sosa’s holistic, web-guided understand-
ing of refl ective justifi cation in general with his non-holistic understand-
ing of refl ective justifi cation for intuitions (and of introspective beliefs). 
First, we both agree that pieces of belief of thoughtful researchers are 
6 Sosa claims that no causal relation between our cogito (or mathematical) belief 
and the fact believed would explain the reliability of that belief:
Take an intricate spider’s web with its many nodes, attached at various points 
to various surfaces. The position of each node might then depend causally (to 
some extent, perhaps to a small extent) on the positions of the other nodes. 
Here there is distributive dependence on each and also collective dependence 
on all. That explains a web model for belief (though beliefs also occupy an 
important dynamical, historical dimension, one that requires a more complex 
web model). Any given belief node is in place through its connections with 
other nodes, but each of them is itself in place through its connections with the 
other nodes, including that original given node. (Sosa 2011b: 150)
Not a single element from this general characterization of refl ective justifi cation 
applies to the particular cases of intuition and introspection. What could justify 
making such an exception, without even presenting it as such?
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typically refl ectively justifi ed, in addition to being immediately, fi rst-
level justifi ed. (We also agree that refl ective justifi cation at its highest 
involves meta-knowledge of risks, but we shall leave that aside here).
Second, we agree that holism is feasible, the way Sosa presents it in 
his Refl ective knowledge (2009a) and in Knowing full well (2011b). We 
agree very much with the following claim of his:
Refl ective endorsement may now take its place in the web with no apparent 
special problems. Through our growing knowledge of ourselves and of the 
world around us and of the relation between the two, we come to see our 
modes of rational basing and other belief acquisition as suffi ciently reliable. 
This enables us to endorse such modes refl ectively as truth-reliable, of a 
sort to lend epistemic justifi cation to our commitments and beliefs. (Sosa 
2011b: 151)
Thirdly, and most importantly, refl ective justifi cation typically mobi-
lizes and indeed should mobilize capacities distinct from the original 
capacity that has produced the belief-candidate for being justifi ed, 
in order to assess the reliability of the original capacity. It has to go 
beyond justifi ers that are of the same kind (“homogeneous”) as fi rst-
level immediate ones, in order to enlarge the circle of justifi cation (and 
thus avoid viciousness), and is, therefore, holistic and coherentist. Sosa 
is quite explicit about this in his writing about broad coherence, and 
explications of the web-metaphor underline it, with insistence of the 
connection of each with every node. Moreover, such a holism is com-
manded by the requirement of total evidence.
If this holds, refl ective justifi cation of armchair beliefs, presumably 
produced by intuition and some reasoning, should revert to empirical 
considerations testifying to the reliability of intuition and reasoning. 
This bring in the a priori/a posteriori contrast. The last paragraph, 
if correct, suggests a further conclusion: refl ective justifi cation of arm-
chair beliefs typically combines, in an articulated way, a posteriori el-
ements contributing to the thinker’s refl ective trust in her armchair 
capacities with some, presumably a priori, components.
Let us be a bit more specifi c. In his general exposition(s) Sosa stress-
es the importance of explanatory coherence. Apply this to intuitions and 
armchair beliefs. Note that the reliability of armchair beliefs is prima 
facie puzzling. A refl ective assessment of armchair beliefs is therefore 
incomplete in total absence of explanation of their having and reliabil-
ity (as is the case with perceptual beliefs). The explanation has to be to 
some extent causal or causal-like. Barring the Cartesian style a priori 
theological grounding, which is very dubious, any such explanation will 
involve appeal to empirically believed assumption. So, the explanation 
of having and reliability will have essential empirical explanatory com-
ponents. Therefore, refl ective justifi cation of armchair belief will have 
essential empirical components. It will have an  important a posteriori 
component, with a clearly defi ned role.
Another candidate for a refl ective source of information about re-
liability is the well-known appeal to global unavoidability and indis-
318 N. Miščević, Intuitions: Refl ective Justifi cation, Holism and Apriority
pensability: unavoidability and indispensability of logic and elemen-
tary mathematical understanding for any kind of cognitive project, 
call them global unavoidability and indispensability, are an important 
refl ective justifi er of logical and mathematical beliefs and inferential 
propensities, perhaps the most important one. This justifi er can justify 
the target beliefs and propensities, only if our global cognitive project 
is a meaningful one, with some chances to succeed. The issue of success 
of our global cognitive project is to a large extent an empirical matter, 
so that we are justifi ed in being optimistic about it on the grounds of 
already achieved empirical and empirically detectable success. The is-
sue of refl ective justifi cation of logical and elementary mathematical 
beliefs and inferential propensities is to be decided to a large extent 
on the basis of global successfulness of our cognitive effort, which is 
largely an a posteriori matter. If this holds, logic and elementary math-
ematical understanding are refl ectively justifi ed a posteriori to a sig-
nifi cant degree.
Interestingly, Sosa himself has been aware for a long time of some 
of the diffi culties listed above. In his 2000 paper he notes, among pos-
sible objections, the “locality of cogito”: cogito is a single proposition, 
but we need certainty over a wider span of propositions. He answers 
that the relevant feature of the cogito is not restricted to a single belief. 
Unfortunately, he does not discuss the analogous “locality” of many 
necessary propositions, which seem to cry for a more holistic treatment. 
More importantly, he notes that “reliability of our a priori beliefs could 
hardly be sustained purely a priori. For we need a grasp of the mecha-
nisms participating in the beliefs’ acquisition, which is a posteriori.” 
(Sosa 2000: 14). He seems to endorse the claim and answers: “Second-
level defense (revision) of our a priori dispositions is also not purely a 
priori” (Sosa 2000: 13). He directs the reader to a claim stated on the 
preceding page: “[I] agree that the refl ective defense of our mathemati-
cal and other a priori beliefs will not be purely a priori” (Sosa 2000: 13). 
But again, after having said this, he retreats, and stresses the possibil-
ity that in the case of the cogito, nothing will be needed beyond a priori 
beliefs, and no causal commitments will become prominent (Sosa 2000: 
14). Elsewhere, he stresses the positive consequences of dropping the 
claims of apriority: “And once any claims of priority are dropped, as I 
am proposing, then it might well be held that cognitio that p and cog-
nitio that one enjoys cognitio that p, are both required for scientia that 
p” (Sosa 2009a: 150, fn. 14).7
7 And there is a streak of explanationism and interest in causal dependence in 
Sosa’s general picture of justifi cation:
Epistemology too, like the aesthetics of dance, reverses the import of causality 
found in instrumental value. The distinctively epistemic evaluation of a cognitive 
performance can depend substantially on its source, unlike the instrumental 
evaluation that depends on effects rather than sources. Consider thus the 
justifi cation of a belief derived from a good inference, as when a detective 
fi gures out who did it, or when you determine how much you owe a shopkeeper. 
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Let me conclude with an example which shows that Sosa does in 
fact recognize the importance of empirical, a posteriori data for the 
full refl ective justifi cation of intuitional beliefs, in this case philosophi-
cal ones. In his paper on possible intuitional foundations of philosophy 
(2011a) he confronts the issue of possible serious divergence in subject 
responses to questions in thought experiments. He comes up with a 
dilemma: “Either experimental inquiry will uncover serious divergence 
in subject responses or it will not”, and argues that in the latter case 
there is no serious problem (Sosa 2011a: 465). If the fi rst horn turns out 
to be actual, we still have a way out: explain away the disagreements 
by differences in semantic understanding. (I apologize for brevity of 
presentation). Note that the moves are made in response to empirical 
fi ndings, and that the last, rescuing move, would also need empirical 
confi rmation, namely the fi nding that in fact the subjects have differ-
ent meanings on their minds when performing the armchair experi-
ment. It is all a piece of clearly a posteriori refl ection on philosophical 
intuitions, geared to offering a sophisticated second-level justifi cation, 
and indicating the limits of thought experimenting, thus resulting in 
our knowing full well the philosophical propositions in question.
To reiterate. The puzzle concerns the question of what refl ective 
knowledge in the domain of intuitions involves? The options seem to 
reduce to the following three:
(a) localistic ratifi cation and self-validation: this is how Sosa charac-
terizes the Refl ective condition for introspection, and by implication, 
intuition: seeing the necessary infallibility (reliability) of our fi rst level 
introspective thoughts (Sosa 2000: 9), or 
(b) rather holistic coherence, in line with the general picture of refl ec-
tive justifi cation. The resulting picture is then either (i) narrow, in-
volving only a priori materials, or (ii) wide? If (ii) wide, then refl ective 
justifi cation becomes to a signifi cant degree a posteriori. If (i) narrow, it 
is unclear why an exception is made for intuitional beliefs.
My fi nal question for professor Sosa is then concerned with his 
considered judgment about the role of the a priori and a posteriori in 
the refl ective justifi cation of intuitions: how are refl ective knowledge, 
broad coherence and the web of belief related in the case of intuitional 
knowledge? And in particular, in the case of armchair philosophical 
intuitions?
Something is then believed because it is concluded from prior information 
already in the thinker’s possession. To draw it as a conclusion and to believe 
accordingly for that reason is, moreover, a broadly causal matter. It is a matter 
of believing such and such because of so and so, or on the basis of a prior belief 
that so and so. Accordingly, the conclusion belief gains its epistemic status 
through being based on the premises inferentially. One believes the conclusion 
at least in part on that basis, for the reason that, as one can see, it follows from 
the already accepted information. The fact that one’s belief in the conclusion is 
thus “motivated rationally” (Sosa 2007: 80).
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4. Conclusion
Let me conclude with two points. First, I would like to sketch the road 
a two-level virtue epistemologist could, and perhaps should, take, if she 
takes seriously the broad coherence (and in particular, its explanatory 
component) at the second refl ective level; I myself did take such a road 
in writing about intuitions and the a priori (Miščević 2006, 2008). Sec-
ond, I would like to reiterate my three questions to professor Sosa.
The fi rst task fi rst. Both Sosa and I agree that obviousness and in-
dubitability give the thinker a prima facie reason for accepting one’s 
intuitions. Neither a Sosa-style moderate externalist nor any natural-
ist should deny this; the latter since for a naturalist normative accept-
ability should follow from descriptive compellingness. In the next step, 
as Sosa has taught us, the thinker tries to achieve a general coherent 
view of her cognitive abilities and their outputs. Of course, one can dis-
tinguish degrees of refl ective, meta-cognitive achievement on the sec-
ond, refl ective level. The lowest degree is guaranteed by the immediate 
attraction-compellingness of contents, i.e. of intuitional propositions. 
If the thinker psychologically cannot doubt some such proposition, 
then she is prima facie allowed to believe it: epistemic ought implies 
epistemic can. Still, a more conscientious thinker would want to have 
a coherent meta-cognitive perspective on deliverances of her cognitive 
abilities, and an explanatory view on functioning of abilities. Again, 
we may distinguish the immediate or folk view (of e.g. perception or 
intuition-ability) from a theoretical perspective on these abilities.
As Sosa puts it in his general proposal, it is the interplay of (the de-
liverances of) all capacities, plus the best explanation of the whole, that 
indicates whether a particular capacity, in this case intuition is reli-
able. (I assume that merely negative coherence with explanation is suf-
fi cient: in other words, if the explanation does not seriously contradict 
the explanandum (and we have argued that it does not), we have good 
reasons to trust our intuitions.) If we apply it to intuitions, we note 
that the explanation-based doubts about intuition, for example, make 
it vivid for the thinker that the immediate compellingness of an intu-
ition need not be suffi cient. But then, the indispensability and success 
come in. Our intuitions cohere with our empirical hypotheses, and en-
able these hypotheses to be tested and confi rmed. Indispensability and 
success are thus capable of almost completely justifying the reliance 
on intuitional knowledge. They come in very handy since they point to 
the massive empirical success of everyday knowledge and of science in 
which such beliefs are essentially used. The success does a posteriori 
vindicate the certainty of elementary logical and mathematical intu-
itions, for which there is a massive overlap with the factual domain.8
8 There is a reasonable philosophical worry that some fl aw in the origin of our 
intuitions might annihilate their justifi cation. What if they come from a demon, 
Descartes asked. What if they are just fi gments of our imagination? How can 
information coming from within have any “validity” for a mind-independent world, 
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What about concepts and understanding? How do our concepts guide 
us? My answer is more extroverted than the traditional conceptualist 
one: the crucial quality about our competence is that it carries correct 
information about the world, and concepts are just a means for encoding 
such information. Intuitions are concerned with their external objects, 
the domain of items and facts, rather than with concepts. Further, they 
require an explanation of having and reliability, if possible a causal one. 
Concepts often play a role in the process, but they are not the object of 
intuitions, and their role is subordinate to the role played by the external 
referential domain. But why are they normally so helpful? My own favor-
ite line is summarized in the following paraphrase of J. L. Austin (where 
the term “words” is replaced with “concepts”):
…the stock of our deepest concepts embodies all the distinctions men have 
found worth drawing, and the connections they have found worth making, 
in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more nu-
merous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the sur-
vival of the fi ttest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably 
practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up on the spot. 
(Austin 1979: 182)
This accumulated wisdom then allows the philosopher to anticipate the 
experience from the armchair. At the same time, the double fallibility of 
these intuitions accounts for the limits of philosophical autonomy: arm-
chair research should be open to corrections from empirical science.
Also, our partly innate endowment might explain at least the very 
origin of the intuition-capacity and the initial stages of the formation 
of our intuition-states with their contents. For instance, it might con-
sist of innate structures, some corresponding to concepts and some to 
inner, spatio-temporal “frames”, responsible for an innate spatial-geo-
metrical know-how. Note that intuitions are often rather scenario-based 
than inference-based. Imagining scenarios, typically particularized ones 
play the main cognitive and justifi catory role, whereas inference typi-
cally plays a subordinate role.
All this explains some of the objective validity of our intuitions. But 
nativism should be restricted to the origin of the system and to the rela-
tively initial stages of processing. An intelligent nativist-adaptationist 
should allow for a wide margin of infl uence from individual empirical 
learning, which may overthrow even some deeply ingrained pre-concep-
tions to the contrary. And most importantly, intuition is doubly fallible. 
It can misrepresent the contents of our cognitive apparatus, and is thus 
internally fallible. But, the contents themselves—including their core, 
the innate assumptions—are also fallible, as Sosa has noted, yielding 
Kant asked (and opted for an anti-realist solution). It is here that the evolutionary 
explanation comes in. Its role is remedial, i.e. to alleviate or to forestall the subtle, 
purely philosophical skepticism focusing upon a distantly and merely possible fl aw in 
the causal ancestry of our intuitions. It thus removes the lingering perplexity about 
the mystery of scientifi c applicability and success of our logical and mathematical 
intuitions.
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the external fallibility of intuitions. Our innate geometry might be 
false, our possibly innate folk-physics certainly is. No deep or strong 
apriority is involved in their deliveries. In short, we can admit an im-
portant role of intuitions, and preserve some of their special status, 
intimated by their phenomenology, without falling into the dangerous 
traps of classical Cartesianism.
Finally, concerning the justifi catory status of intuitions, one needs 
to combine a posteriori considerations with the a priori ones; the result 
will be a structured justifi cation, with distinct elements coming from 
distinct sources. So much about the refl ective-level proposal, to some 
extent inspired by Sosa’s stress on broad coherence and the role of the 
web-of-belief as a whole.
Let me conclude by re-iterating my questions for professor Sosa:
If Sosa accepted that at least some prima facie justifi cation is be-
stowed on the belief by seeming-attraction, he would end up with two 
tiers, the coherentist and the foundationalist one, in addition to the two 
levels. The question for professor Sosa is then whether this would be 
acceptable for him, and if not, why.
The second question: how does our intuitional competence connect 
with the world it produces judgments (more precisely, attractions to 
judge) about? Intuitions seem to connect us to mathematical and mod-
al reality, to facts of metaphysical signifi cance, moral signifi cance and 
perhaps more (linguistic intuitions, etc.). Let us agree that concepts are 
somehow involved in the feat; but how precisely?
My fi nal question for professor Sosa is then concerned with his consid-
ered judgment about the role of the a priori and a posteriori in the refl ec-
tive justifi cation of intuitions: how are refl ective knowledge, broad coher-
ence and the web of belief related in the case of intuitional knowledge? 
And in particular, in the case of armchair philosophical intuitions?
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